ANTI-DEFECTION LAW

  • The Anti-Defection Law aims to prevent individual Members of Parliament (MPs) and Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) from switching parties after being elected.
  • It was added to the Constitution as the Tenth Schedule through the 52nd Amendment Act in 1985 to promote stability by discouraging legislators from changing parties.
  • It was introduced in response to the frequent toppling of state governments due to party-hopping by MLAs, especially after the 1967 general elections.

Key Provisions of the Anti-Defection Law

  • Group Defections: Allows MPs/MLAs to merge with another party without penalty if two-thirds of the party members support the merger (as per the 91st Amendment, 2003). Earlier, one-third support was sufficient.
  • Election Post-Disqualification: Disqualified members can recontest from any party for a seat in the same House.
  • Decision on Defection: The Speaker/Chairperson decides disqualification cases, subject to judicial review, but no timeframe is specified for this decision.

Grounds for Defection:

  • Voluntary Resignation: Leaving the party voluntarily.
  • Voting Against Party Directions: Voting or abstaining contrary to party instructions without prior permission.
  • Independent Members: Joining a party after election.
  • Nominated Members: Joining a party after six months of nomination.

Impact of Defection on the Political System

  • Subversion of Mandates: Defections undermine electoral mandates, as legislators shift parties for ministerial positions or financial gains.
  • Government Instability: Frequent defections lead to administrative instability, as seen in the 1960s (“Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram” era).
  • Promotes Horse-Trading: Defections encourage unethical bargaining of legislators, contradicting democratic principles.

Challenges with the Anti-Defection Law

  • Merger Clause: Requires two-thirds support for party mergers but lacks clarity on whether it applies at the national or regional level.
  • Undermines Democracy: MPs/MLAs are bound by party directions, limiting independent judgment and weakening accountability.
  • Role of Speaker: No specified timeframe for the Speaker’s decision on defection cases, leading to delays and inconsistent outcomes.
  • No Recognition of Split: The 91st Amendment acknowledges mergers, not splits, allowing only large-scale defections.
  • Limits Debate: Focuses on party loyalty over open debate, failing to distinguish between dissent and defection, thereby weakening parliamentary discussions.

Way Forward

  • Restrict Scope: Apply the Anti-Defection Law only to votes affecting government stability, such as budget approvals or no-confidence motions.
  • Change Decision Authority: Shift disqualification decisions from the Presiding Officer to the President (for MPs) or Governor (for MLAs), based on the Election Commission’s advice, as recommended by the NCRWC.
  • Ensure Impartiality: Justice Verma in Hollohan’s judgment highlighted that the Speaker, dependent on majority support, lacks the independence needed for fair adjudication.

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